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Preface
The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo
was a watershed moment in the definition of population policies. The Cairo
meeting put an end to the unproductive debate as to whether the provision of
family planning services or improvements in social and economic development were more instrumental in setting the stage for the achievement of voluntary fertility decline. The answer at Cairo was a resounding both are essential. Cairo went on to define what kind of services were the most desirable and
what kind of development was the most empowering, particularly with respect
to the achievement of reproductive choice. Despite this strong dual message
from Cairo, only the call for a move away from a narrow vision of family planning services to a broader client-centered reproductive health approach is
widely understood. The second and equally important theme—What kind of
development?—has received considerably less attention.
The Overseas Development Council and the Population Council collaborated in May 1997 to host a discussion of this vexing issue—What Can Be
Done to Foster Multisectoral Population Policies? What can be done to make
the concept more real, and to move policy thinkers in and out of governments
to realize that many factors over and above family planning availability are at
issue? What are the institutional barriers? What are the relative roles of
donors, different ministries in national governments, coordinating processes,
and constituents and community-based groups? The proceedings of the
28 May seminar offer some answers. Some seventy people spoke in frank
terms about the promise of this idea, but also the frustrations encountered in
moving it forward. The report that follows assists in a broadening conceptualization of population, and attests to the value of embedding population policies within a human development framework. The ODC has a long commitment to the analysis and discussion of development policy issues, including
population, and the Population Council has long explored human welfare
implications of unwanted pregnancy, poor reproductive health, and unsustainable levels of population growth. Together we are joined in pressing for the
engagement across the gamut of developmental energies to achieve a sustainable balance between people and resources.
Margaret Catley-Carlson
President
Population Council

John Sewell
President
Overseas Development Council
1

Introduction
The 1994 Cairo population conference affirmed the need for broadly defined
multisectoral population policies, recognizing the contribution that investments in education and improvements in income distribution, child health, and
women’s access to and control of resources may play in voluntary fertility
decline. Yet, as we begin the fourth year of implementation of the ICPD agenda, little tangible progress has been made toward realizing the goal of multisectoral population policies. This report provides a brief summary of an informal seminar cosponsored by the Population Council and the Overseas
Development Council on “What Can Be Done to Foster Multisectoral
Population Policies.” The purpose of the meeting was to generate frank discussion among those working in the population field about the national, international, institutional, political, and policy factors that have, so far, largely
impeded articulation and implementation of multisectoral population policies.
The seminar was held on 28 May 1997 at the Overseas Development
Council in Washington, DC. George Zeidenstein, Distinguished Fellow of the
Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies, presided as moderator. The structure of the seminar consisted of four brief presentations on current research and policy issues, followed by open discussion. Participants with
a wide range of backgrounds, expertise, and affiliations took part in the seminar in their individual capacities, not as representatives of their respective
institutions. Though no formal minutes were taken, Lisa Bates served as rapporteur and prepared this summary report. No attribution has been made to
participants’ comments other than those made in the formal presentations.
Catherine Gwin of the Overseas Development Council and Judith
Bruce of the Population Council opened the seminar and outlined the goals of
the meeting: 1) to clarify the rationale for and importance of fostering multisectoral population policies; 2) to share past experiences with trying to develop multisectoral approaches and to identify lessons for future efforts; and 3) to
identify new potential opportunities for advancing multisectoral strategies,
such as South to South initiatives, NGOs and grassroots mobilization, and the
engagement of high-level government officials.

Presentations
John Bongaarts of the Population Council began the presentations by providing the empirical basis for pursuing multisectoral strategies. He presented
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a brief overview of his decomposition exercise, which disaggregates the components of population growth into unwanted fertility, high desired family size,
and population momentum—the tendency of populations to continue growing
after replacement-level fertility has been achieved, due to a young age structure. Disaggregated projections of global population growth show that population momentum alone will account for an increase in less developed countries
from 4.5 billion (1995 level) to 7.3 billion by the year 2100; high desired fertility will raise the total an additional one billion, to 8.3 billion; and unwanted
fertility will increase it to 10.2 billion. Further application of the exercise to
individual countries illustrates that the composition of population growth can
vary substantially across countries and highlights the importance of countryspecific evaluation of the different components. For example, in India, the
Philippines, and Kenya the role of population momentum in future growth outweighs that of other factors: in these countries it will account for 61 percent, 66
percent, and 68 percent of future population growth (respectively) but contribute less than half of the future growth in sub-Saharan Africa, where the most
significant factor remains high desired family size (see Figures 1–3).* In general, the causes of population growth shift over time, and the relative importance
of momentum as a factor increases as countries approach the transition to
replacement-level fertility.
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tum is partly the result of desirable improvements in child health, it is also not
entirely removable. However, it is quite possible to substantially alter population growth through even modest changes in the timing of future fertility. For
example, the standard population projection for Bangladesh by the year 2100
is 253 million. Momentum alone will produce a population of 244 million, but
with a 2.5-year delay in the median age of mothers at first birth (currently
about 18 years), this figure would be 223 million; and with a 5-year delay
(bringing the median age at first birth to 23 years), 206 million.
Bongaarts concluded that in the past, when unwanted fertility was a proportionately more significant source of population growth than it is today, population policies expressed principally through support for family planning services may have made more sense. However, the increasing importance of
other factors in future growth, such as population momentum, and
the availability of broadly desirable policy options for effectively
reducing such factors, point to a need to go beyond the provision of
family planning services to fostering a wider range of social investments (e.g., reductions in child and infant mortality and increases in
school enrollment rates) to reduce population growth.
Anrudh Jain then presented some of the conclusions from his research on
the evolution of population policy in four countries—India, Egypt, Kenya, and
Mexico. He noted that, traditionally, population policies have been focused narrowly on reducing population growth in the interest of achieving macro socioeconomic development. The improvement in individual wellbeing was for the
most part a secondary, implicit consideration in most population policies. The
provision of family planning services was the predominant means for achieving
demographic goals, so much so that still today “population” is often considered
synonymous with “family planning.” In contrast, the current, broadened perspective on population policy that emerged from the 1994 Cairo conference
focuses explicitly on the promotion of individual wellbeing and encourages
attention to population stabilization as one policy component among many. Jain
noted that this paradigm shift implies that some policy instruments (namely
those which compromise individual rights and welfare) are no longer acceptable
and that other sectors, beyond family planning services, become more important
for creating conditions favorable to small families.
Jain noted a number of factors affecting this and future policy evolution:
1. the background and outlook of political and religious leaders;
2. the influence of international institutions—traditionally focused on
macroeconomic growth concerns but in recent years adopting a broader policy perspective;
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3. the availability of timely information through, for example, surveys
and censuses, which can be an important instigator of action; and
4. domestic constituencies such as NGOs which influence and in turn
are influenced by the prevailing policy agendas among governments
and international institutions.
Jain also outlined key issues and likely obstacles in the implementation of
the broadened population policy agenda:
1. A lack of conceptual clarity: Under the broadened population policy
approach, the goals and means become much the same—socioeconomic development.
2. The absence of effective bureaucratic structures for policy coordination
in government and donor institutions: Persistent sectoralization has usually favored family planning at the expense of other important areas.
3. Disagreement among academics: There is no consensus on the relative
importance for fertility decline of different policy responses, for example, family planning versus education (versus employment); within
education there is also disagreement on the level and kind of education that are most important.
4. Persistent concerns about the implications for funding for family planning if a multisectoral paradigm is prompted.
5. A lack of effective accountability mechanisms for both governments
and donor agencies.
Concerning the obstacles posed by bureaucratic structures, Jain noted that
most of the developmental expenditures required to create conditions favorable
to small families are not controlled by agencies responsible for population stabilization or fertility reduction. Within the UN system, for example, the UNFPA
has very little influence over the resources allocated for improving child health,
female education, or economic opportunities for women. These funds are controlled by other UN agencies. Though the population and family planning divisions of donor agencies and national governments have the option to promote
and deliver services in ways that, for example, empower women or increase gender equality, they have no power over the allocation of funds beyond their
respective sectors. Consequently, population policy discussions usually
take place among a limited set of actors, such as population-specific
(read family planning) ministries or departments and their donor
agency counterparts. It is rare to include, for example, representatives of
ministries of education, social affairs, or employment. Jain was recently a member of the World Bank team that was responsible for the population sector
review in India. While this mission resulted in a call for broad population poli-
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cies, the pivotal discussions took place between the representatives of the
Department of Family Welfare and the team members headed by the Bank’s
Resident Advisor for Population, Health, and Nutrition, and not between India’s
Planning Commission or the Finance Ministry and a team headed by the World
Bank’s Country Representative. Consequently the Bank’s report was full of recommendations for how to reframe services—moving India’s Family Welfare
Program toward a Reproductive and Child Health Program (not a small achievement by any means)—but had little to say about the role of other sectors.
Concerning the lack of agreement among academics, Jain noted that even
reaching agreement on the importance of improving female education for fertility reduction would not be sufficient. A second order of questions within the
education sector has to be addressed, namely the benefits of broad coverage in
primary versus narrow coverage in secondary education; nonformal out-ofschool education for adults versus formal in-school education; and the quantity versus the content and quality of education. Many of these debates are challenging both empirically and politically. The relationship between education
policies and outcomes is not straightforward, and the relationship found in one
setting may not apply to another. Furthermore, depending upon the answers to
these questions, additional resources would be required for the education sector, and/or resources within the education sector would need to be reallocated.
Either of the two strategies (increasing education resources or reallocating
within the sector) is likely to encounter opposition. The proponents of family
planning are concerned that additional resources for education could mean a
reduction in resources for family planning; and lobbies within the education
sector do not usually favor a shift from higher to lower level education.
Jain noted that there are three options for the operationalization of population policies. Population policy can be implemented through family planning
programs alone, through broadened reproductive health services, or by bringing population decisions to bear on all development sectors (including, but not
limited to, family planning services) as part of a broad human development
policy.* While working in conjunction with other development sectors (the
third option) may be preferable, it is not currently popular with many development professionals or the mainstream population professionals. Embedding
population concerns within a human development strategy may generate sub*The human development framework is an example of a broad, integrated approach that in many ways embodies a
multisectoral population perspective and, specifically, incorporates the strategies necessary for creating conditions
for voluntary fertility decline. See Robert Cassen with Lisa M. Bates, Population Policy: A New Consensus
(Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, Policy Essay No. 12, 1994). However, human development policies have not traditionally emphasized reproductive health, including family planning.
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stantial resistance because, among other things, many development professionals may have limited understanding of demographic processes and may
still question the expenditure of public resources on family planning.
Similarly, many population professionals fear that recognizing the role of other
development processes in decreasing population growth will weaken commitment to support for family planning services.
Addressing these concerns will require additional research and practical
support. For example, the proponents of vertical family planning programs
need to be convinced that providing contraceptive services in the context of
other reproductive health services, or adding new components to family planning programs, will be cost-effective in reducing fertility. Professionals who
have worked primarily in an economic development framework need to be convinced that incorporating population concerns will not compromise internal
economic efficiency. Where efforts to weave population concerns into human
development policy are not yet well enough understood or not yet feasible in
terms of implementation, at a minimum, sector-specific policies can be
redefined so that it is clear that family planning and reproductive
health are responsible only for reducing unwanted fertility and
improving health while other, relevant sectors with a clearly established role in demographic change—e.g., education—are responsible
for addressing the social and economic factors that underpin high
desired family size and early childbearing.
Beyond these issues, Jain noted that it may be worth considering whether
we need to pursue multisectoral population policies through governments
alone; with the shift taking place in most countries from centrally planned or
mixed economies to market economies, the role of governments in social engineering is waning. Though governments’ commitment to these issues is essential, other avenues (e.g., mass media, NGOs) are offering individuals new
opportunities and influencing behavior. The population community needs to
encourage a greater level of commitment on the part of the private sector (both
commercial and NGO) to offering opportunities to all individuals, irrespective
of their gender, race, religion, or caste.
Finally, Thomas Merrick of the World Bank and Adrienne Germain of
the International Women’s Health Coalition reflected on their experiences with
the negotiation of the Fifth Population Project in Bangladesh. The World Bank
is a member of the consortium of donors that has been actively involved in the
development of successive national population projects in the country.
Adrienne Germain has participated in this process as a consultant to the
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), another member of the
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consortium. Over the years the consortium has encouraged the expansion of
government policy from a narrow focus on population control and contraceptive delivery toward a more multisectoral approach that addresses broader
development and gender concerns. Bangladesh and its development partners
have agreed that to achieve sustained progress toward improving the health as
well as slowing the growth of Bangladesh’s population, it will be necessary to
improve both the quality and availability of health and family planning services. The longer term vision for the health and population sector is an
approach that is responsive to clients’—especially women’s—needs, provides
quality services, has adequate service delivery capacity, and is financially sustainable. This vision is articulated in the Bangladesh Health and Population
Sector Strategy (HPSS) and is consistent with the objectives of the ICPD
Program of Action, to which Bangladesh has subscribed.
Bangladesh and its development partners are now preparing a multi-year
operational and financing program (the 5th Health and Population Project) to
implement HPSS. They have agreed to merge resources to support an essential
package of services in order to better meet the needs of women, children, and
the poorest groups. In contrast to the separate, vertical systems for maternal
and child health and for family planning, the essential package incorporates
both reproductive and child health services as well as control of key communicable diseases and limited curative care. It will be bolstered by health reform
initiatives designed to ensure that the system can deliver the package with the
most efficient and effective methods available. One of the most controversial of
these initiatives is the establishment of a single cadre of field workers, which
would end the long-standing distinction between staff responsible for family
planning and those dealing with other health issues.
Merrick noted that while two goals of the current (4th) project address the
components of population increase, namely decreasing unwanted fertility and
raising the average age at marriage, there has so far been much more progress
in designing activities to address the former than the latter. Since the early
projects there have also been attempts to incorporate multisectoral population
activities, such as credit and income generation schemes and vocational training programs designed to lower fertility demand. However, these have typically been small-scale pilot demonstration projects, and, although effective (in
terms of increasing contraceptive prevalence rates in specific project areas),
they have yet to be incorporated on a larger scale into the government’s broader development programs.
Merrick identified several obstacles to the achievement of multisectoral
policies at a number of levels in Bangladesh. One of the problems with previ-
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ous “multisectoral” population initiatives in Bangladesh is the compartmentalization of what are nominally multisectoral activities—most remain within
the population sector, are not linked to the mainstream, and have not been
“scaled up” from pilot projects. Typically, because these initiatives have been
sponsored by the family welfare unit of government and have been targeted on
delivering and increasing demand for family planning services, they have generated limited interest and ownership outside of the family welfare sector, and
created little incentive for other ministries or NGOs to take over funding.
A particularly daunting obstacle to multisectoral population
efforts concerns where to situate them institutionally. In Bangladesh,
for example, concerns about ministerial capacity have discouraged a number
of donors from promoting more integrated approaches to service delivery for
fear of overburdening the government. The Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare is weak relative to other ministries and lacks the mandate to act multisectorally. Furthermore, the ministry and the government planning commission have been plagued with problems of bureaucratic control and ownership,
leading to a narrow, top-down, “projectized” focus on individual activities.
Although the recently elected government has revived the high-level National
Population Council, it too is likely to be subject to bureaucratization and therefore limited in its effectiveness. Merrick suggested that the growing emphasis
on civil society and popular participation in Bangladesh may offer a more
promising avenue for fostering integrated population and development work
than high-level government channels.
A third obstacle relates to implementation capacity. Often NGOs have
been more successful than governments with experimental approaches. For example, BRAC experimented with a system of health workers appointed by and accountable to their own village groups. They refined the approach
with assistance from ICDDR,B and worked hard to build bridges between the
village and government health systems. This enabled a scaling up of the experimental effort to a country-wide “Essential Health Care Program,” which covers many of the services in the essential package that will be included in the
new government program.
Germain reflected on the Bangladesh example within the larger context of
changes in the population field that emerged from the 1994 Cairo conference.
The consensus achieved at Cairo reaffirmed the centrality of development and
human rights concerns. She emphasized that much of what is needed to
achieve population goals needs to be done anyway and that health, women’s
empowerment, rights, and poverty alleviation are recognized as being important policy objectives in their own right. As a way of implementing the
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multisectoral approach mandated by the ICPD agenda, Germain
advocated the application of a “Cairo population lens” to development planning, investments, and programs. A “Cairo population lens”
encompasses health, empowerment, and rights concerns, not only demographic factors. She proposed that such a lens would help avoid both the narrow project approach and marginalization of population issues that too often occur
when population is addressed as a separate “sector” by a government planning
commission. A “Cairo lens” approach would avoid the treatment of population
as a separate—family planning centered—sector driven by special population
commissions or councils, which, by definition, are isolated from mainstream
development policy.
For example, in Bangladesh, rather than a “National Population Council”
there could be a high-level “National Development Council,” which, among
other approaches, would apply a Cairo population lens in its work. The overall
policy priorities of such a council would include:
1. Poverty alleviation and social justice through equitable economic
growth, job creation, and access to other economic resources: More
attention is still needed to remedy gender discrimination in employment, particularly within government, given its substantial role as an
employer in Bangladesh. There is also a need to address the constraints on formal employment opportunities for women by, for example, investing in alternative livelihood options such as microcredit or
secondary crops and livestock where women traditionally dominate.
2. Human capital investments, namely education and health: Donors
have been instrumental in encouraging increases in girls’ enrollment
in schools, and “affirmative action” is now a legitimate education policy goal in Bangladesh. However, there are still sizable gender gaps in
enrollment. As important, much more attention needs to be paid to the
content of education in order to encourage gender equity, legitimize
later age of marriage, and the like.
3. Human rights: Women’s rights in particular need attention and a gender analysis and rights perspective should be applied to investments
in all sectors.
4. Reproductive health and family planning: In addition to improved
services, a critical dimension of programming in this sector with enormous potential for change is population Information, Education, and
Communication (IEC)—for both policymakers and the public. The
nature and content of IEC is critical, yet many of the current messages
do not reflect Cairo objectives or methodologies.
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The composition of a National Development Council would not resemble
that of the traditional planning commission, but rather consist of cabinet-level
government officials in addition to representatives of civil society and the media.
Germain stressed that ensuring that a Cairo population lens is applied effectively to broad-based development policymaking will require sustained political
will, appropriate institutional arrangements, and consistent donor support.
Carefully selected demographic analysis, such as the decomposition exercise
described by John Bongaarts, can also be persuasive and make clear that effective population policy must have many parts.

Discussion
The discussion centered around three broad themes: 1) identifying the
antecedents of multisectoral approaches and positioning them within historical
population policy debates; 2) refining the conceptual framework for thinking
about multisectoral approaches; and 3) exploring the implementation mechanisms most likely to ensure that the important contributions of all sectors and
constituencies are recognized and incorporated into population policies.

What is the historical basis for multisectoral population policies?
The pursuit of broad-based multisectoral population and development strategies is not new. In 1974, the World Population Conference was dominated by
the notion that “development is the best contraceptive”—a rejection of the
prevailing supply-side emphasis on the provision of family planning services
as the key to stemming population growth. In 1976, the U.S. Foreign
Assistance Act section 104d legislated that all foreign assistance actions be
evaluated for their demographic implications. Those development activities
most likely to accelerate fertility decline were deemed preferable. In addition,
other sectors, such as agriculture and the environment, have long struggled to
achieve integrated or cross-cutting strategies.
Participants noted that, given this historical precedent, progress in the implementation of multisectoral approaches has been slow. However, there is now at
least more consensus on the need for the broader approach and human development goals such as education and gender equality. Indeed, as participants
observed, the Cairo conference put to rest long-running debates over the relative
importance of supply versus demand factors in slowing population growth. The
multisectoral approach affirmed at Cairo validates the importance of
both family planning services and socioeconomic development; what
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remains is to determine "what kind" of services improve
reproductive choice and health and "what kind" of socioeconomic
development creates the optimum conditions for voluntary fertility
decline.

What is the appropriate cross -cutting conceptual framework?
Much of the discussion centered on the purpose and nature of the proposed lens through which to view
development investments. It was stressed that a "lens" should distinguish population as a cross-cutting
perspective rather than a sector on its own, and should prevent the "projectization" that is typical of
traditional planning exercises. This perspective could reinforce an investment focus on human welfare goals
such as poverty alleviation, health, and education which too often remain only "spoken" priorities. Participants
generally agreed that an "ICPD lens" would reflect the goal of achieving a more holistic perspective. They
emphasized that a conventional "population lens" would narrow the focus and exclude other crosscutting
themes, such as gender and human rights. One participant expressed concern that as the relative share of U.S.
foreign assistance and policy attention devoted to population and social development concerns increases, the
U.S role. in promoting economic growth is diminishing in ways that are ultimately detrimental to all
development goals. A narrow population lens may crowd out the traditional economic development concerns.
Another participant identified some of the "dangers" of a lens that prioritizes demographic concerns: broader
development objectives might be neglected if they were not perceived to be the most direct means to
demographic ends; a thoughtless attachment to girls' education as a demographic "engine" could be pursued
narrowly, leading to a focus, for example, on enrollment rates at the expense of education climate and content
(e.g., attitudes toward girls in school, gender stereotypes in education materials) and other critical adolescent
issues. It was agreed that gender, rights, and economic growth and equity need to be an integral part of a
cross-cutting perspective and that any lens. that implied a one-dimensional, demographic perspective would
be highly undesirable.

What are the most promising implementation mechanisms and institutional arrangements to
ensure a multisectoral approach?
The role of donors
Several participants noted that donors have played an important role in countries like Bangladesh by
encouraging the broadening of population policies. In Bangladesh, for example, the World Bank has had a
substantial impact on girls' school enrollment rates through its scholarship program, and the donor
consortium as a whole has been a strong, persistent voice for investments in gen-

der equality. In other countries, however, there is still substantial room for
improvement on the donor side; one participant mentioned the often unbalanced gender makeup of donor representation and noted that voices on gender
issues among donors are few and faint, and often hampered by concerns for
“cultural sensitivity.”
As an alternative to a formally integrated, multisectoral approach, it was
suggested that a sector-specific approach among donors may be appropriate
whereby individual donors would specialize in different aspects of the broad
population agenda. Such an approach would require a degree of donor coordination that has been difficult to achieve with respect to other development sectors and concerns. To accomplish effective coordination, donors must be “credited” with making investments in population outside of family planning. For
example, donor investments in girls’ education should be considered co-equal
with support for contraceptive services. However, even if the elusive coordination could be achieved, the disproportionate influence of leading donors often
results in skewed emphases on demographic goals. For example, the dominance and narrow focus of a key donor in one South Asian country has resulted in a lopsided emphasis on services and fertility reduction in IEC messages.
Government arrangements
A major area of discussion concerned the institutional locus and implementation structures for multisectoral policies. It was stressed that an entity such as
Germain’s proposed National Development Council in Bangladesh would be
different from the traditional national planning bodies, which tend to divide
into vertical sectors. A council at cabinet level would have an integrated, multisectoral mandate. Such a high-level government body would have the authority to direct broad, multisectoral investment decisions that “planning commissions” typically lack.
As in the case of donor roles, alternatives to an overall, coordinated multisectoral approach were also discussed with regard to government arrangements. One option might be to improve attention to poverty, gender,
distributional effects, and other ICPD concerns within each sector.
Participants noted that this has not been attempted to a sufficient degree at the
level of national governments and that there may be ways to sensitize key individuals, such as politicians and ministerial officials, to apply such a perspective to their existing work. On a pragmatic level, it was argued that it may not
be feasible to affect allocation decisions across sectors, and therefore energy
should be spent focusing on how a lens can influence investment decisions
within each sector, and on how programs can be better analyzed with an eye to
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fertility effects. However, in response, participants felt that sensitizing individual sectors would not be sufficient because the personnel within each sector do not have a vested interest in adopting an “ICPD perspective.”
Considerations of gender, equity, and fertility effects are therefore too often
easily marginalized.
Implementation strategies
Many participants stressed that, in addition to high-level government and
donor participation, involvement at the grassroots level is also essential. It was
suggested that when communities participate in policy development
and implementation they naturally become advocates for integrated
strategies because they experience their needs as intensely interlinked, and it is through such approaches that their human development needs can best be addressed. Local and international NGOs can also
act as important advocates for human rights and other concerns and help
ensure the accountability of governments and donors. Involving civil society is
thus imperative. It was noted, however, that change at the top is often a prerequisite for grassroots and NGO participation. For example, the fact that the
World Bank president now requires that all Bank projects include stakeholder
consultations has had a substantial impact on the development of the Fifth
Population Project in Bangladesh.
Regarding implementation, participants emphasized the possibility of widespread lateral replication of successful small-scale multisectoral projects (e.g.,
credit unions with social components), rather than or in addition to centralized
replication. In essence, some of the best community-based multisectoral efforts
are not top-down but “side-to-side.” It was noted that in countries such as
Bangladesh and in sub-Saharan Africa there have been numerous small successes repeated in such large numbers that, for example, over half of all landless families in Bangladesh have access to some form of credit. Donor approaches and
implementation styles that encourage this “lateral” replication of multi-purpose
community-based efforts could be an essential part of a multisectoral strategy.

What are the potential mechanisms for engaging broader constituencies in the pursuit of multisectoral population policies?
Making better use of existing information
Many participants pointed to the need for better information and knowledge
both to persuade government officials and donor representatives of the importance of integrated approaches and to implement more effectively multisectoral
activities. Successful programs depend on a broad-based constituency
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of support, and engaging ministries of finance and planning requires
both a compelling rationale and the empirical evidence to support it.
It was noted that the Cairo conference has expanded the base of support for
population and family planning activities by highlighting their relevance to
health and welfare goals but that the other linkages—with economic performance, for example—have yet to be explicated. To date there has been little
attention in the population field to current research on the strong linkages
between economic growth, poverty alleviation, and income inequality. Yet new
evidence suggests that income inequality may limit economic growth and, by
definition, the entry of more individuals into the middle classes may alone
accelerate fertility decline. Participants suggested that the empirical support
should include more sophisticated and country-specific information about the
components, interrelationships, and consequences of population growth (e.g.
fertility rates by income class).
Participants also emphasized the necessity of providing more specific
guidance to donors (for example, what kind of investments in girls’ education).
Historically the population community has been equipped to provide technical
advice only with respect to family planning, while it has been less enthusiastic about and less technically proficient in how to increase women’s access to
and control of resources, expand girls’ participation in education, and so forth.
This observation prompted a recognition that the population community is
insular and a multisectoral approach cannot be fostered unless new
talents are drawn in and collaboration is far more inclusive. As long as the
population community draws largely on demographers and health professionals, interventions will inevitably be focused on family planning (and health).
Making a persuasive political case
An additional determining factor in the promotion of multisectoral policies that
can act as both an opportunity and an obstacle is politics. As noted above, participants suggested that domestic and international constituencies, such as
women’s health advocates, can be important agents for positive change. At the
same time, however, shortsighted political considerations (e.g. the fear of
immigration) or funding concerns (how and where to raise family planning dollars) can and do drive research and investment decisions in negative ways.
Several participants noted the importance of semantic clarification as part
of education and constituency-building efforts. There is a need to undo the narrow equating of population with family planning that was used to raise funds
historically and that persists today. When there are funding crises, the old language of population control and demographic imperative can dominate the
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arguments made to politicians. These narrow population or even health-centered concerns too often end up driving policy and programs. There needs to
be both a more careful selection of language in making arguments and a clearer separation between the arguments made for financial and donor support and
the content of policies. Often the challenge is to translate initially demographically founded concerns into an understanding of the importance of broad investments in human welfare. Too often, proposed “solutions” emphasize family planning programs (and sometimes investments in the
health sector) alone rather than tapping into the resources and strengths of
multiple sectors and strategies.

Conclusion
A multisectoral approach to population policy is strongly justified on both
demographic and human development grounds. The growing importance of factors underlying population growth—particularly now as population momentum
constitutes the lion’s share—that cannot be addressed adequately by family
planning services alone necessitates the active engagement of other sectors,
such as education and employment. It is the involvement of these other sectors
that sets the stage for delayed childbearing and voluntary fertility decline. In
addition, the focus on individual welfare and the importance of human rights,
gender equity, and broad-based socioeconomic development affirmed at Cairo
mandates the meeting of a range of human needs including, but not limited to,
access to contraception. A multisectoral approach thus encompasses classic
“supply” and “demand” dimensions of population debates, reflecting the synergistic relationship between the two: as socioeconomic development generates
smaller family size aspirations, the constituency for quality family planning
services increases.
In terms of “what can be done,” seminar participants identified a number
of mechanisms through which to foster multisectoral policies. An ICPD lens
can be applied across all sectors led by an overarching institution, potentially
resulting in a change in the allocation patterns between sectors. Or such a lens
can be used within each sector to promote reproductive choice and health and
create conditions for fertility decline. A multisectoral strategy requires the
support of high-level government entities that possess the cross-sectoral budgeting authority typically lacking in traditional planning commissions.
Donors’ posture is also crucial; they can play a destructive role, narrowing
and sectoralizing population concerns, or they can educate others about the
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necessary breadth of population policies. Concretely, they can encourage collaboration and thoughtful activity across and within different sectors, examining in turn the roles of various ministries, community participation strategies, and so forth. Donors can bring a crucial new approach to implementation styles, insisting upon far greater participation and integrated service
delivery approaches at the ground level. To the extent that donors continue to
identify closely with one sector or the other, and are “experts” in, for example, family planning or education, it is crucial that they acknowledge the roles
that each sector has in the broader population picture, and that they collaborate accordingly.
To sum up, although Cairo provided a ringing endorsement to approaching
population as a human welfare issue through a diversity of sectors, the case
continues to need to be made. Presenting the idea to traditional population
constituencies, development professionals, and activists requires: 1) clarity
about how this approach is different from past family planning–only approaches; 2) compelling rationales and examples demonstrating the desirability and
feasibility of engaging a breadth of sectors; and 3) evidence that some
approaches can increase the “trade-ons”—satisfying the conventional costeffectiveness requirements within each sector while setting the stage for voluntary fertility decline. To the extent that shortcuts are taken in rhetoric and
when mobilizing resources in competitive, political environments, it is vital
that the shorthand problem definition and rationale for mobilizing resources to
reduce population growth or improving reproductive health not be translated
into a simple “one-note” program of action.
Finally, seminar participants stressed the importance of educating and
persuading within as much as without. The population community must
become more aligned with the human development agenda and increase its
collaboration with professionals in and advocates for various economic and
social development initiatives. An insular population community cannot
inspire the broad and desirable social and economic changes necessary to promote reproductive choice, health, and voluntary fertility decline.
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